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Abstract
The use of offensive language is a major
problem in social media which has led to an
abundance of research in detecting content
such as hate speech, cyberbulling, and cyber-
aggression. There have been several attempts
to consolidate and categorize these efforts. Re-
cently, the OLID dataset used at SemEval-
2019 proposed a hierarchical three-level an-
notation taxonomy which addresses different
types of offensive language as well as impor-
tant information such as the target of such
content. The categorization provides meaning-
ful and important information for understand-
ing offensive language. However, the OLID
dataset is limited in size, especially for some
of the low-level categories, which included
only a few hundred instances, thus making it
challenging to train robust deep learning mod-
els. Here, we address this limitation by creat-
ing the largest available dataset for this task,
SOLID . SOLID contains over nine million En-
glish tweets labeled in a semi-supervised man-
ner. We further demonstrate experimentally
that using SOLID along with OLID yields im-
proved performance on the OLID test set for
two different models, especially for the lower
levels of the taxonomy. Finally, we perform
analysis of the models’ performance on easy
and hard examples of offensive language using
data annotated in a semi-supervised way.
1 Introduction
Offensive language in social media has become
a concern for government entities, online commu-
nities, and social media platforms. One of the most
common strategies to tackle the problem is to train
systems capable of recognizing messages contain-
ing offensive language, which can then either be
deleted or set aside for human moderation.
WARNING: This paper contains tweet examples and
words that are offensive in nature.
There have been a number of studies on the appli-
cation of computational methods to dealing with
offensive language, particularly for English (David-
son et al., 2017; Basile et al., 2019). As pointed in
a recent survey (Fortuna and Nunes, 2018), various
terms have been used in the literature to describe
phenomena with overlapping characteristics such
as toxicity, hate speech, cyberbullying, and cyber-
aggression, to name a few.
Recent studies have investigated the overlap
between these abusive language detection tasks
(Waseem et al., 2017). The Offensive Language
Identification Dataset, or OLID ,1 (Zampieri et al.,
2019a), used in SemEval-2019 Task 6 (OffensE-
val) (Zampieri et al., 2019b), is one such example.
OLID contains 14,100 English tweets, which were
manually annotated using the following three-level
taxonomy:
A: Offensive Language Detection;
B: Categorization of Offensive Language;
C: Offensive Language Target Identification.
The taxonomy proposed in OLID makes it possi-
ble to represent different kinds of offensive content
such as hate speech and cyberbulling as a function
of the type and of the target of a post. For exam-
ple, many offensive messages targeting a group are
likely to be hate speech whereas many offensive
messages targeting an individual are likely to be
cyberbulling. OLID ’s taxonomy became popular
due to its simplicity and flexibility. It has been used
to annotate datasets in other languages such as Ara-
bic (Mubarak et al., 2020) and Greek (Pitenis et al.,
2020), thus allowing for multilingual learning and
analysis.
1https://sites.google.com/site/
offensevalsharedtask/olid
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An inherent feature of the hierarchical annotation
approach is that the lower levels of the annota-
tion scheme contain a subset of the instances in
the previous level of annotation. This represents
an important shortcoming as more levels of anno-
tation are included in the taxonomy, the less in-
stances there are be in each lower category, thus
making it very difficult to train robust deep learn-
ing models on such datasets. In addition, due
to the natural infrequency of offensive language
(e.g., less than 3% of the tweets are offensive when
selected at random), obtaining offensive content
is a costly and time-consuming effort. In this pa-
per, we address these limitation by proposing a
new dataset: Semi-Supervised Offensive Language
Identification Datatset (SOLID ).2
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We are the first to apply a semi-supervised
method for collecting new offensive data us-
ing OLID as a seed dataset, thus avoiding the
need for time-consuming annotation.
2. We create and publicly release SOLID , a
dataset containing 9 million English tweets for
offensive language identification, the largest
dataset for this task.
3. We demonstrate sizeable improvements com-
pared to prior work on the mid and lower lev-
els of the taxonomy where gold training data
is scarce when training on SOLID and testing
on OLID .
4. We provide a comprehensive analysis of EASY
(i.e., simple explicit Tweets such as using
curse words) and HARD (i.e., more implicit
tweets such as the use of underhanded com-
ments or racial slurs) examples of offensive
tweets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 presents related studies in aggres-
sion identification, bullying detection, and other
related tasks. Section 3 describes the OLID dataset
and annotation taxonomy. Section 4 introduces the
computational models used in this study. Section 5
presents the SOLID dataset. Section 6 discusses the
experimental results and section 7 offers additional
discussion and analysis.
2Available at: https://sites.google.com/
site/offensevalsharedtask/solid
2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss offensive language de-
tection and related tasks.
Aggression Identification: The TRAC shared task
on Aggression Identification (Kumar et al., 2018)
provided participants with a dataset containing
15,000 annotated Facebook posts and comments in
English and Hindi for training and validation. A
Facebook and Twitter dataset were used for testing.
The goal was to discriminate between three classes:
non-aggressive, covertly aggressive, and overtly
aggressive.
Bullying detection: There have been several stud-
ies on cyber-bullying detection. For example, Xu
et al. (2012) used sentiment analysis and topic mod-
els to identify relevant topics, and Dadvar et al.
(2013) used user-related features such as the fre-
quency of profanity in previous messages.
Hate speech identification: This is by far the most
studied abusive language detection task (Kwok and
Wang, 2013; Burnap and Williams, 2015; Djuric
et al., 2015; Ousidhoum et al., 2019; Chung et al.,
2019). One of the most widely used datasets is the
one by Davidson et al. (2017), which contains over
24,000 English tweets labeled as non-offensive,
hate speech, and profanity. A recent shared task on
the topic is HatEval (Basile et al., 2019).
Toxicity detection: The Toxic Comment Classifi-
cation Challenge3 was an open competition at Kag-
gle, which provided participants with comments
from Wikipedia organized in six classes: toxic, se-
vere toxic, obscene, threat, insult, and identity hate.
The dataset was also used outside of the compe-
tition (Georgakopoulos et al., 2018), including as
additional training material for the aforementioned
TRAC shared task (Fortuna et al., 2018).
Offensive language detection: This is the most
relevant line of research, with several shared tasks
on this topic. For example, the GermEval 20184
(Wiegand et al., 2018) shared task focused on of-
fensive language identification in German tweets.
A dataset of over 8,500 annotated tweets was pro-
vided for a course-grained binary classification task
in which systems were trained to discriminate be-
tween offensive and non-offensive tweets. Another
3http://kaggle.com/c/
jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge
4http://projects.fzai.h-da.de/iggsa/
Tweet Level A Level B Level C
@USER Does anyone care what that dirtbag says??? OFF TIN IND
Poor sad liberals. No hope for them. OFF TIN GRP
LMAO....YOU SUCK NFL OFF TIN OTH
@USER What insanely ridiculous bullshit. OFF UNT NULL
@USER you are also the king of taste NOT NULL NULL
Table 1: Examples from the OLID dataset
relevant shared task is the one at HASOC 20195
(Mandl et al., 2019). In this paper, we build on the
work of Zampieri et al. (2019a) and the aforemen-
tioned OLID dataset. OLID is annotated following
a hierarchical three-level annotation schema. It
differs from other datasets that have used hierarchi-
cal annotation schemes (Basile et al., 2019; Mandl
et al., 2019) because it takes both the target and
the type of offensive content into account. This al-
lows multiple types of offensive content (e.g., hate
speech and cyberbulling) to be represented in OLID
’s taxonomy. Here, we extend this work by creating
a large-scale semi-supervised dataset, following the
same annotation taxonomy as in OLID .
3 The OLID Dataset
The OLID (Zampieri et al., 2019a) dataset tackles
the challenge of detecting offensive language using
a hierarchical labeling schema.
3.1 Labeling Schema
The schema for the OLID proposes a hierarchical
modeling of offensive language, which classifies
each example using the following three-level hier-
archy:
3.1.1 Level A: Offensive Language Detection
Level A asks whether the text is offensive (OFF) or
not (NOT):
NOT: content that is neither offensive, nor pro-
fane;
OFF: content containing inappropriate language,
insults, or threats.
3.1.2 Level B: Categorization of Offensive
Language
Level B asks whether the offensive text is targeted
(TIN) or not (UNT):
5https://hasocfire.github.io/hasoc/
2019/index.html
TIN: targeted insult or threat towards a group or
an individual;
UNT: text containing untargeted profanity or
swearing.
3.1.3 Level C: Offensive Language Target
Identification
Level C categorizes the target of the offensive con-
tent:
IND: the target is an individual explicitly or im-
plicitly mentioned in the conversation;
GRP: hate speech, targeting group of people
based on ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
religious belief, or other common characteris-
tic;
OTH: targets that do not fall into any of the previ-
ous categories, e.g., organizations, events, and
issues.
3.2 Annotated Data
The training part of the OLID dataset contains
13,241 examples, while the testing part contains
860 tweets. Detailed statistics about the distribu-
tion of the labels in all 3 levels are shown in Table 3.
We can see that there is a substantial class imbal-
ance on each level of annotation, most significant at
Level B. Furthermore, there is a sizable difference
in the total number of annotations between differ-
ent levels: level A contains 13,241 tweets, but level
C only has 4,089 tweets. While this is expected,
based on the nature of the annotation schema it-
self, it indicates a need for creating a large dataset.
Table 1 shows examples from the OLID dataset,
demonstrating all possible label combinations.
4 Models
Below, we describe the models we use in the semi-
supervised annotation framework and subsequently
for evaluating the contribution of SOLID for offen-
sive language identification. In order to maximize
the diversity of the models’ rationales, we construct
a suite of heterogeneous machine learning mod-
els consisting of PMI (Turney and Littman, 2003),
FastText (Joulin et al., 2016), LSTM (Hochreiter
and Schmidhuber, 1997), and BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019). These models have diverse inductive bi-
ases, which is an essential prerequisite for our semi-
supervised setup (see Section 4.5).
4.1 PMI
We use a PMI-based model that computes the n-
gram-based similarity of a tweet with respect to the
tweets of a particular class c in the training dataset.
In its nature, the model is naı¨ve as it accounts only
for the n-gram frequencies in the discrete token
space and only for the context of the n neighboring
tokens. Following (Turney and Littman, 2003),
we compute the PMI score for each n-gram in the
training set with respect to each class as follows:
PMI(wi, cj) = log2
(
p(wi, cj)
p(wi) ∗ p(cj)
)
(1)
where p(wi, cj) is the frequency of n-gram wi in
instances of class cj , p(wi) is the frequency of
n-gram wi in instances from the entire training
dataset, and p(cj) is the class frequency.
Additionally, we find that semantically oriented
PMI scores contribute to an improved performance
of this naı¨ve method, and we compute them as
follows:
PMI − SO(wi, cj) =
= log2(
p(wi, cj) ∗ p(C \ {cj})
p(wi, C \ {cj}) ∗ p(cj))
(2)
where C \ {cj} is the set of all classes except cj .
At test time, for each instance, we add the PMI
and the PMI-SO scores for each unigram and bi-
gram with respect to each class. Then, we select
the class with the highest score. We additionally
remove words that appear less than five times in
the training set and we add a smoothing constant
of 0.01 for all frequencies. If the instance contains
no words with associated scores, we choose NOT
for Level A and UNT for level B, which are the
most likely classes to contain a word with a neutral
class orientation. For Level C, we choose class
IND, which is the majority class.
4.2 FastText
Considering the naturally noisy structure of tweets,
a reasonable extension over the word-based model
is to use subword representations. A strong sub-
word model is FastText (FT) (Joulin et al., 2016),
which has shown strong performance on vari-
ous tasks without the need for extensive hyper-
parameter tuning. The FastText model for text
classification uses a shallow neural model, similar
to the continuous bag-of-words model (Mikolov
et al., 2013), but instead of predicting the word,
based on its neighbors, it predicts the target label
based on the words in the sample. The input of
this neural model is a one-hot representation of the
word and also of its n-grams (Joulin et al., 2016).
We use FastText for two main reasons. First,
FastText is inherently different from both the sim-
ple PMI model and from the heavy-lifting LSTM
and Transformer models, thus giving a valuable
modeling representation for the overall ensemble.
Second, while deep neural models have greater
representational and modeling power, their perfor-
mance may vary greatly depending on the task, the
number of training examples, and the amount of
hyper-parameter tuning performed. Thus, we argue
that the robustness and the simplicity of FastText
is a good choice for semi-supervised training.
We train the FastText model with bigrams and a
learning rate of 0.01 for Levels A and B, and with
trigrams and a learning rate of 0.09 for Level C.
For all tasks, we use a window of size 5 and a
hierarchical softmax loss.
4.3 LSTM
The LSTM (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997)
model builds a continuous representation of the
input tweet in a sequential manner, where at each
step, it decides which information to update, reset,
and output to the next step. The LSTM model
can account for long-distance relations between
words, but its loss of information along the steps
can become severe. One partial solution of the
information bottleneck problem, which we also
use, is to use an attention mechanism (Vaswani
et al., 2017), thus allowing for lookups of previous
step outputs.
The first layer of the LSTM model is an embed-
ding layer, which we initialize with a concatena-
tion of the GloVe 300-dimensional (Pennington
et al., 2014) and FastText’s Common Crawl 300-
dimensional embeddings (Grave et al., 2018). The
embedding layer is then followed by a dropout
and a bi-directional LSTM layer with an attention
mechanism on top of it. We concatenate the results
of the attention mechanism with both averaged and
maximum global poolings over the outputs of the
LSTM model. The final prediction is produced
by a sigmoid layer for Levels A and B, where we
have binary classification, and softmax for Level
C, where we have three classes.
We train the LSTM model using early stopping
with a patience of five epochs over the validation
loss. For Level A, we use an LSTM model with a
hidden size of 128, a dropout rate of 0.3, a batch
size of 256, and a learning rate of 0.0002. For
Level B, the LSTM model has a hidden size of
50, a dropout rate of 0.1, batch size of 32, and a
learning rate of 0.0001. Finally, the Level C LSTM
model has hidden size of 50, a dropout rate of 0.1,
batch size of 32, and a learning rate 0.0001. We
use the Adam optimizer for training.
4.4 BERT
We use BERT as an instance of the Transformer
models, where the representation of each token is
constructed by attending to all tokens in the input
using multiple attention heads. While Transformers
do not encode positional information in the same
way as recurrent models do, sentence order is still
modeled, but using positional embeddings.
In our experiments, we use the base uncased
model, which has 12 layers, a hidden size of 768,
and 12 attention heads, amounting to 110 million
parameters. We use the classifier wrapper of the
BERT model from HuggingFace (Wolf et al., 2019).
Finally, we fine-tune the BERT model for each task,
starting from the same pre-trained base model.
BERT has achieved (nearly) state-of-the-art per-
formance for a number of NLP tasks, showing both
high representational power and nice robustness
across tasks. By using a pre-trained model and
fine-tuning it for our tasks, we enjoy the benefits of
transfer learning in a low-resource setup.
We fine-tune BERT for 2, 3, and 3 epochs for
Level A, B, and C, respectively, and we use learn-
ing rates of 0.00002 for Levels A and C, and
0.00004 for Level C. In order to cope with the data
imbalance in Level C, we apply per-class weights
on the loss as follows: IND=1, GRP=2, OTH=10.
We use the Adam optimizer and a linear warm-up
schedule with a 0.05 warm-up ratio.
4.5 Democratic Co-training
Democratic co-training is a semi-supervised tech-
nique that can be effectively used to create large
datasets with noisy labels when provided with a set
of diverse models trained on a supervised dataset.
This approach has been successfully applied in
tasks like time series prediction with missing data
(Mohamed et al., 2007), the early prognosis of aca-
demic performance (Kostopoulos et al., 2019), or
in the health domain (Longstaff et al., 2010).
In our work, we employ democratic co-training
(Zhou and Goldman, 2004) to create semi-
supervised labels for all three levels of SOLID us-
ing OLID as our seed set. In democratic co-training,
distant supervision is conducted by an ensemble of
models with different inductive biases:
1. TrainN diverse supervised models {Mj(X)},
where j ∈ [0, N ] on a labeled dataset X =
{(xi, yi)}, where i ∈ [1, |X|]
2. For each example x′i in the unannotated
dataset X ′ = {(x′i)}, |i ∈ [1, |X ′|]) and each
model Mj , predict the confidence p′i
j for the
positive class.
We train all models on the OLID dataset. We use
a 10% split of the training dataset for fine-tuning.
The performance of the individual models on the
OLID dataset is shown in Table 2.
BERT is the best model for Level A. The PMI
model performs almost on par with the LSTM mod-
els, which we attribute to the size of the dataset and
to the fact that a simple lexicon of curse words
would be highly predictive of the offensive content
present in a tweet. The FastText model has the
worst performance, which is still relatively high
compared to the rest of the models.
BERT is best for Level B as well, followed by
LSTM. PMI and FastText perform even worse as
the task becomes harder for frequency and n-gram
based approaches.
At Level C, the overall performance of the mod-
els gets even worse as both the size of the dataset
becomes smaller, and the task gets harder. The
BERT and the LSTM models outperform FastText
and PMI, with BERT being the best model.
5 The SOLID Dataset
In this section, we describe the process of collect-
ing a large dataset of over 12 million tweets used
Model Level A Level B Level C
BERT 0.816 0.705 0.568
PMI 0.684 0.498 0.461
LSTM 0.681 0.657 0.585
FastText 0.662 0.470 0.590
Table 2: Macro-F1 score of the models in the demo-
cratic co-training ensemble on the OLID test set.
Level Label OLID SOLIDTrain Test Train Analysis
A OFF 4,640 240 1,448,861 1,090
NOT 9,460 620 7,640,279 2,807
B TIN 4,089 213 149,550 850
UNT 551 27 39,424 1,072
C
IND 2,507 100 120,330 580
GRP 1,152 78 22,176 190
OTH 430 35 7,043 80
Table 3: Train and Test/Analysis data distribution for
the OLID and the SOLID datasets.
for training and analysis. All of the data was la-
beled using the democratic co-training approach
described in the previous section.
5.1 Large-Scale Dataset of Tweets
We collected our data from Twitter using the Twit-
ter streaming API6 via Twython7. In order to down-
load truly random tweets, we searched using the
20 most common English stopwords such as the,
of, and, to, etc. Using such stopwords ensured that
we were more likely to obtain English tweets as
well as a nice variety of random tweets while stay-
ing within the rate limiting constraints imposed by
Twitter. We kept the stream running the entire time
and we continuously chose a stopword at random
but based on its frequency in a large monolingual
corpus8. We then collected 1,000 tweets for that
stopword. Thus, tweets including more frequent
stopwords were collected more frequently. A full
list of the stopwords and their frequency is shown
in Appendix A.1.
We used langdetect9 to select English tweets and
6https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs
7https://twython.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/
8Project Gutenberg:https://en.wiktionary.
org/wiki/Wiktionary:Frequency_lists#
Project_Gutenberg
9https://pypi.org/project/langdetect/
we discarded tweets that were less than 18 charac-
ters or less than two words long. We substituted
all user mentions with @USER for anonymization
purposes, and we further ignored tweets with URLs
as those tend to be less interesting and not offen-
sive. This procedure allowed us to collect over
6,000 quality tweets in 40 minutes. In total, we
collected over 12 million tweets. We kept 9 million
as training data, which we release publicly, and
we created an analysis dataset from the remaining
3 million tweets with more remaining for future
testing and analysis. All of our data was labeled
in a semi-supervised manner using the democratic
co-training approach described in Section 4.5.
5.2 Semi-Supervised Training Dataset
To create our semi-supervised training set, we com-
puted the average and the standard deviation of the
confidences predicted by each of the models in the
democratic co-training setup, as described in Sub-
section 4.5. Therefore, the semi-supervised dataset
SOLID = {(x′i, p′i)|i ∈ [1, |SOLID|])} where p′i
= avg({p′ij |j ∈ [1, N ]}), std({p′ij |j ∈ [1, N ]}) is
the aggregated single prediction. The distribution
of the scores across the dataset is shown in Ap-
pendix A.2.
In particular, we computed the scores based on
the confidences for the positive class at Levels A
and B and the confidences for the IND, GRP, and
OTH classes at Level C. We performed the above
aggregation step instead of just using the scores
of each model in order to avoid overfitting to any
particular model in the ensemble. Our intention for
having both the average and the standard deviation
was to stimulate different aggregation schemes of
the semi-supervised data and, at the same time, to
disallow model approximations or any assumptions
based on the models.
First, we annotated all the tweets in a semi-
supervised manner with the labels of level A. Then,
we selected the subset of tweets that all models
were confident were likely offensive (BERT and
GRU ≥ .5, PMI and FT=OFF) to annotate for
Level B. Finally, we chose the tweets likely to be
TIN at Level B with a standard deviation lower than
0.25 for Level C. The size and the label distribution
across the datasets can be found in Table 3 and
examples of tweets and their confidence for each
model can be found in Table 4.
Level Text BERT LSTM FT PMI AVG STD Label E/H
A
@USER he fucking kills me. he knew it was coming 0.919 0.958 0.852 0.509 0.809 0.177 OFF E
His kissing days are over, he’s a pelican now! 0.659 0.304 0.568 0.523 0.514 0.131 NOT H
i think we’re all in love with winona ryder 0.060 0.038 0.017 0.480 0.102 0.155 NOT E
B
Guess Ill just never understand the fucking dynamics 0.901 0.569 0.001 0.617 0.522 0.327 UNT H
@USER Government is a bunch of bitches. 0.013 0.221 0.000 0.397 0.158 0.164 TIN E
@USER Give me the date. Fuck them other niggas Bro Im
irritated as fuck
0.882 0.666 0.983 0.701 0.808 0.131 TIN E
C
@USER He was useless stupid guy 0.807 0.915 1.000 0.480 0.801 0.197 IND E
It’s like mass shootings is the reg in this shit hole country! 0.826 0.479 0.693 0.570 0.642 0.131 OTH H
Getting these niggas tatted is a overstatement are ya dead
serious
0.700 0.691 0.770 0.491 0.663 0.104 GRP H
Table 4: Training data aggregation examples. The first four columns show the confidence of each of the models
with respect to the positive class in Level A and B (OFF, UNT) and only for the corresponding class in C (one
example for each of the classes: TIN, GRP, OTH). The label column shows manual annotations, and the last
column shows whether the tweet is considered Easy (E) or Hard (H) based on its AVG.
6 Experiments and Evaluation
In this section we describe our experiments and
results when training with OLID + SOLID data
compared to just OLID on the OLID test set.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We used BERT and FastText models from the semi-
supervised annotation setup to estimate the im-
provements in performance when training on OLID
+ SOLID . We kept the same FastText models, but
we tried to improve the performance of BERT via
fine-tuning. We achieved improvements for Lev-
els B and C by upsampling the underrepresented
classes: for all of the classes, we sampled K in-
stances, where K is the number of instances for
the most frequent class. We further removed the
warm-up in Levels B and C as this yielded better
results for Levels B and C.
When training on SOLID along with the super-
vised training dataset, we used different schemes
for combining the two sources of supervision,
OLID and SOLID , as well as different thresholds
for the confidence of the instances in SOLID . The
models in this set of the experiments were fine-
tuned on the 10% validation split of the training
dataset used during co-training.
The FastText model used an external command-
line tool without any control over the training data
for the separate epochs. Therefore, we merged
the training split of OLID and SOLID , randomly
shuffled them, and evaluated the same models with
the new combined dataset.
For BERT, due to the computational require-
ments of the Transformers, we subsampled 20,000
tweets from SOLID data in Level A. Including
more semi-supervised instances did not yield any
performance improvements. We further balanced
the SOLID and the OLID datasets in Levels B and
C by oversampling the underrepresented classes.
During training, we used SOLID in the first epoch
and the supervised training set in the next two fol-
lowing epochs for Level A. In Level A, the training
split of OLID was already sufficient to train a string
Transformer model. In other words, the SOLID
dataset served only for initial fine-tuning because
using it later in the training process after training
with OLID yielded worse results. For Levels B and
C, we trained for two epochs with the training split
of OLID and then for one epoch with SOLID . At
Levels B and C, we observed that using SOLID
in the initial training epochs and then fine-tuning
with OLID , did not yield any performance benefits.
Furthermore, training with the OLID first and then
using SOLID for the final epochs, yielded substan-
tial performance improvements. In Levels B and
C, OLID had a small number of training instances,
which provided a good initial training signal, but
when used in the final training epochs, caused the
model to overfit to a specific region without being
able to generalize on the test split.
For both models, we selected the most confident
examples based on the average and the standard de-
viation scores. We chose only the instances with an
average confidence score for each level as follows:
Level A: avg(OFF) < 0.2 ∪ avg(OFF) > 0.7
Level B: avg(UNT) < 0.3 ∪ avg(UNT) > 0.7
Level C: avg(IND) > 0.8 ∪ avg(GRP) > 0.7 ∪
avg(OTH) > 0.65
6.2 Results
In this section we describe our results for the exper-
iments described in the previous section based on
combining SOLID with OLID in the training phase.
The results are shown in Table 5,
First, we observe that the results for Level A are
improved only for the FastText model. At this level,
we find that the BERT model already achieved high
performance as the supervised training dataset is
larger. As a result, including more semi-supervised
data did not improve the model’s performance. On
the other hand, the FastText model, which had the
worst performance at this level, managed to im-
prove its accuracy with a large margin when given
SOLID along with the supervised training set. Our
findings are also in line with the study of Longstaff
et al. (2010), who observed that democratic co-
training performed well when the initial classifiers
accuracy was low.
For Level B, the OLID training dataset is smaller,
and the task is more complex. We observe that in-
cluding SOLID yields performance improvements
for both models. We achieve a modest improve-
ment for BERT and a large margin of improvement
of 0.121 points for FastText.
Finally, in Level C, the supervised OLID dataset
is even smaller and the complexity of the subtask is
more pronounced, particularly due to three possible
labels. Interestingly, including SOLID in the Fast-
Text model does not yield better results. This might
be due to the fact the model already achieves perfor-
mance on par with the BERT model, and as already
stated, democratic co-training performs well when
the initial classifiers accuracy is low. On the other
hand, the SOLID data helps the BERT model and
by a large margin of 0.054 points absolute.
7 Discussion
In the experiments and results section, we de-
scribed our performance using the large semi-
supervised dataset as additional training data on
the OLID test set. However, OLID is rather small,
particularly for Levels B and C. Therefore, we
also annotated a portion of our held-out 3 million
tweets in order to be able to analyze the perfor-
mance in more detail. In particular, we focused
on tweets that the model predicted to be Offen-
sive. First, all co-authors of this paper annotated
48 tweets that were predicted to be OFF in or-
der to measure inter-annotator agreement (IAA)
using P0 = agreement per annotationtotal annotations∗num annotators . We
Dataset BERT FastText
Level A
OLID 0.816 0.662
+SOLID 0.809 0.720
Level B
OLID 0.712 0.470
+SOLID 0.735 0.591
Level C
OLID 0.589 0.590
+SOLID 0.643 0.515
Table 5: Macro-F1 score on the OLID test set for the
BERT and the FastText models with and without using
SOLID during training.
found IAA to be 0.988 for Level A, with an al-
most perfect agreement for OFF/NOT. The IAA for
Level B was .818, indicating a good agreement on
whether the offensive tweet was TIN/UNT. Finally,
for Level C, the IAA was 0.630, which is lower
but still considered reasonable and Level C is more
complicated because it uses a 3-way annotation:
IND/GRP/OTH. In addition, a tweet may target
more than one label (e.g. both an individual and a
group) but only one label can be chosen.
After having observed high IAA, we continued
to annotate additional offensive tweets for analysis
with a single annotation per instance. We divided
our Level A data into four portions based on the
models confidence where 0 stands for NOT and 1
is for OFF:
• if BERT ≥ .8 ∧ PMI = OFF ∧ FT = OFF ∧
GRU ≥ .8 then Easy OFF [284 tweets]
• if BERT ≥ .5 ∧ PMI = OFF ∧ FT = OFF ∧
GRU ≥ .5 then Hard OFF [835 tweets]
• if BERT < .5 ∧ PMI = NOT ∧ FT = NOT ∧
GRU < .5 then Hard NOT [278 tweets]
• if BERT ≤ .2 ∧ PMI = NOT ∧ FT = NOT ∧
GRU ≤ .8 then Easy NOT [2500 tweets]
We annotated a total of 1,397 tweets for level A.
The portions annotated based on confidence are
shown above in square brackets. In addition, in
order to properly test Level A (where we only la-
beled offensive tweets), we also took a random set
of 2,500 Easy NOT tweets, where we mimic the
ratio found in the OLID dataset of 2.6 OFF tweets
to NOT tweets. The test sizes are shown in Ta-
ble 3. Of the 1,397 tweets annotated, 307 were
Model
# Type Prediction Tweet Gold Label
1 Easy OFF this job got me all the way fucked up real shit OFF UNT
2 Easy OFF @USER Its such a pain in the ass OFF UNT
3 Easy OFF wtf ari her ass tooo big OFF TIN IND
4 Easy NOT This account owner asks for people to think rationally. NOT
5 Hard OFF It sucks feeling so alone in a world full of people NOT
6 Hard OFF @USER We are a country of morons OFF TIN GRP
7 Hard NOT Hate the sin not the sinner... NOT
8 Hard NOT Somebody come get her she’s dancing like a stripper OFF TIN IND
Table 6: Example tweets from the SOLID Analysis dataset and the four subsets it is composed of. Shown are the
difficulty of each subset, the ensemble model prediction for the examples in each subset, an example tweet’s text,
and the gold label for that example.
Model Gold Label Total
Type Prediction OFF NOT
easy OFF 275 9 284
easy NOT 0 2,500 2,500
hard OFF 670 165 835
hard NOT 145 133 278
Total 1,090 2,807 3,897
Table 7: Statistics about the SOLID Analysis dataset
and the four subsets it is composed of. Shown are the
difficulty of each subset, the ensemble model predic-
tion for the examples in each subset, and the gold label
distribution.
determined to be NOT. We annotated an additional
1,922 OFF tweets to use for levels B and C 10 where
level C is a subset of the TIN tweets from B.
In total, we annotated 3,319 tweets, and we se-
lected 2,500 random NOT tweets for a total of
5,819 tweets in our Analysis dataset. In all cases,
all three levels were annotated and the decision of
whether a tweet in Level B/C is Easy or Hard is
still based on its Level A confidence. In the future,
we plan to have a larger single set for all levels.
Table 6 shows some example tweets including
whether they are Easy OFF/NOT (lines 1-4) or
Hard OFF/NOT (lines 5-8) and Table 7 shows
statistics about the dataset. In particular, note that
determining the labels for the Hard examples is not
simple to decide and the model does make incor-
rect predictions such as in lines 5 and 8. In fact,
10The tweets in the analysis set for Level A differ from
those in Levels B and C to accommodate the Semeval-2020
Evaluation (Zampieri et al., 2020) task schedule.
25% of the Hard OFF tweets that we annotated
were determined to be NOT. In contrast, less than
3% of the Easy OFF tweets were determined to be
NOT.
Model-Dataset Full Easy Hard
Level A
BERT-OLID 0.914 0.987 0.524
+SOLID 0.916 0.989 0.531
FastText-OLID 0.865 0.944 0.538
+SOLID 0.871 0.949 0.539
Level B
BERT-OLID 0.568 0.637 0.516
+SOLID 0.627 0.722 0.572
FastText-OLID 0.374 0.457 0.314
+SOLID 0.494 0.597 0.434
Level C
BERT-OLID 0.635 0.638 0.632
+SOLID 0.670 0.721 0.619
FastText-OLID 0.372 0.364 0.381
+SOLID 0.537 0.542 0.522
Table 8: Experiments on the SOLID Analysis dataset,
as well as on the easy and on the hard subsets thereof.
Shown are macro-F1 scores.
Next, we performed our experiments as de-
scribed in Section 6.1 on the SOLID analysis set.
Our goal is two-fold: 1) We focus on the Easy vs.
Hard examples to gain better insight into why some
tweets are easier to predict as offensive than others,
and 2) OLID is small (particularly for B and C).
Therefore, showcasing the performance on a larger
amount of data can indicate the stability of the test
set. The results are shown in Table 8. In almost
all cases including SOLID with OLID provides an
improvement in performance.
The Level A results on the Easy tweets achieves
almost 99% macro-F1, but for Hard, they are below
54%. Furthermore, using SOLID provides a nice
improvement for the BERT model on the Hard
tweets which was not evident in OLID the test set
in Table 5. To provide further insight into why the
results are so high for Easy OFF tweets in Level
A we implemented a a simple curse word baseline
using only the absence or presence of 22 curse
words such as fuck, bitch, and nigga. A full list of
the curse words used in the baseline can be found
in Appendix A.1. We found that the majority of
the Easy tweets can be classified correctly with
this baseline with 93.6% F-score. We note that for
Level A the full results are much better than on
the OLID dataset in Table 5. We expect this is due
to our selection of tweets for analysis and that it
indicates there are more Easy tweets in the analysis
set. In contrast, the curse word baseline is not as
effective on the hard examples, achieving a macro-
F1 score of 58%. These tweets are offensive due to
other language such as negative biases rather than
the appearance of a curse word such as examples 6
and 8 in Table 6.
The difference between Easy OFF/NOT and
Hard OFF/NOT tweets is less pronounced for Lev-
els B and C. In level B the gap is up to 16% absolute.
We believe that the curse word imbalance in Easy
tweets effects level B as well because UNT tweets
tend to have curse words, which is evident by the
larger number of UNT tweets in the test set such as
the example in line 2 of Table 6. In level C, there is
usually no difference; TIN tweets may have curse
words but that does not necessarily impact who
the target is. Finally, the results for all levels vary
greatly for both models compared to the results on
the OLID test set. This indicates that further work
is needed to generate a large stable test set.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We present SOLID , a large-scale semi-supervised
training dataset for offensive language identifica-
tion containing nine million English tweets created
using an ensemble of four different models. To the
best of our knowledge, SOLID is the largest dataset
of its kind. SOLID is freely available11 to the re-
search community, and it was released as training
11https://sites.google.com/site/
offensevalsharedtask/solid
material for the English track of SemEval-2020
Task 12 (OffensEval 2020) (Zampieri et al., 2020).
We have shown that including SOLID yields no-
ticeable performance improvements for levels B
and C on the OLID test set. Furthermore, we ana-
lyze Hard and Easy tweets and identify that detect-
ing the Hard offensive tweets (such as those that do
not contain curse words) is still an open challenge.
In the future, we hope to release a new larger test
set for OLID and SOLID .
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A Appendices
A.1 Data Collection and Analysis
We described our method for collecting
tweets in Section 5 of the main paper.
We collect tweets using the most frequent
English words based on the large mono-
lingual Project Gutenberg corpus (https:
//en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wiktionary:
Frequency_lists#Project_Gutenberg). Ta-
ble 9 shows the top-20 most frequent words in
the corpus and their frequency which we used
to collect tweets. The normalized value is the
percentage of the total frequency for all top 20
words. We randomly pick a number between 0 and
1, and choose the word based on the normalized
value. For example, .45 would be “and”
In Section 4 we discussed the simple curse word
baseline used to analyze the Easy OFF/NOT tweets.
Table 10 lists the 22 curse words used in the base-
line.
A.2 SOLID Scores Distribution
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the average
and the std scores for Level A produced for each
instance, as described in Subsection 5.2. We can
observe that the average confidence has one large
peak around 0.2 and represents that the models
highly agree on a lot of instances from the majority
class NOT. We can also find a small peak near the
average of 0.8, which corresponds to the consol-
idated prediction of the OFF class. The standard
deviation of the predicted confidence scores is dis-
tributed mainly between 0.1 and 0.2.
Figure 2 presents the scores for Level B. Apart
from the peaks around 0.2 and 0.8, representing
models’ aggregated prediction for the UNT and
TIN classes, we also find that there is a large num-
ber of predictions that are clustered around the
average confidence of 0.5. The latter indicates that
there is a substantially large number of instances
that the ensemble is not confident about. This might
be a result of the more significant differences in the
models’ confidences, as indicated in Subfigure 3c.
Finally, Figure 3 presents the distribution of the
average and the std scores for Level C for each
of the separate classes. We can conclude that the
ensemble is usually more confident about instances
from the IND class and rarely predicts instances
from the other classes.
word frequency normalized
the 56,271,872 0.20
of 33,950,064 0.32
and 29,944,184 0.43
to 25,956,096 0.52
in 17,420,636 0.58
i 11,764,797 0.63
that 11,073,318 0.67
was 10,078,245 0.70
his 8,799,755 0.73
he 8,397,205 0.76
it 8,058,110 0.79
with 7,725,512 0.82
is 7,557,477 0.85
for 7,097,981 0.87
as 7,037,543 0.90
had 6,139,336 0.92
you 6,048,903 0.94
not 5,741,803 0.96
be 5,662,527 0.98
her 5,202,501 1.00
Table 9: The top-20 frequent English words. The last
column is the normalized value based on the total fre-
quency of all the top words. The random number gen-
erated between 0 and 1 will determine which word is
chosen.
ass arse wtf lmao
fuck bitch nigga nigger
cunt effing shit hell
damn crap bastard idiot
stupid racist dumb f*ck
pussy dick
Table 10: The 22 common offensive terms used in the
curse word baseline.
(a) Average Confidence (b) Confidence STD
Figure 1: Distribution of the aggregation scores produced for each instance as over the four confidence scores of
each supervised model for Level A.
(a) Average Confidence (b) Confidence STD
Figure 2: Distribution of the aggregation scores produced for each instance as over the four confidence scores of
each supervised model for Level B.
(a) Average Confidence, class=IND (b) Average Confidence, class=GRP (c) Average Confidence, class=OTH
(d) Confidence STD, class=IND (e) Confidence STD, class=GRP (f) Confidence STD, class=OTH
Figure 3: Distribution of the aggregation scores – average (top) and STD (bottom), produced for each instance as
over the four confidence scores of each supervised model for Level C.
